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Preface
This hitherto unpublished 1990 paper presents my views on the “many-worlds,” or, as I prefer to
call it, following Everett, the “relative state” interpretation of quantum mechanics. It was rejected
by one journal in 1990, primarily on the (I think incorrect) grounds that it was too similar to the
Albert and Loewer “many minds” version. It has seen limited circulation since then. My views
are quite similar to ones since put forth by Simon Saunders, and subscribed to by David Wallace,
among others. I believe that, within the relative state interpretation, when an observer interacts
with a system in a measurement process in such a way that the combination of the two evolves
into a superposition of the observer seeing macroscopically different apparatus pointer readings
(or other macroscopic states), the observer’s consciousness “forks” or “splits,” because only those
subspaces of Hilbert space describing definite macroscopic measurement results satisfy psycho-
logical/philosophical conditions for supporting a unified consciousness persisting through time.
These conditions probably include things like the persistence of memory, and are probably closely
linked to the “decoherence” of certain subspace decompositions or approximate decompositions,
corresponding to persisting macroscopic “classical” structures that can support such persisting
memories—relating the approach to the decoherence-based ones of, for example, Zurek, and Zeh,
though this relation was not much stressed in the paper.
I still agree with most of what is in the paper, with some notable exceptions. First, the dis-
cussion of how one might have empirical evidence for “nonprobabilistic indeterminacy” seems
shaky: the evidence cited might just as well be taken to be evidence “against independent trials,”
or “against exchangeability.” (This does not vitiate the point that relative state-er’s may need to
establish not just that if there are probabilities they must be the Born ones, but that (on the relative
state interpretation) the indeterminism facing a quantum experimenter about what will be subjec-
tively experienced as an outcome is correctly viewed as probabilistic at all.) Second, as I think the
1990 referee pointed out, the “improvement on Everett’s derivation” of probabilities (sec. 8.2),
while it uses Gleason’s theorem to avoid Everett’s assumption that the probability of a wavefunc-
tion component can depend only on its squared modulus, does not justify the noncontextuality
assumption implicit in Gleason’s theorem. There are also more minor exceptions—for instance,
I now see somewhat less value in de Broglie-Bohm-Bell nonlocal hidden variable theories than
suggested toward the end of this paper.
Note that while I think it has much to teach us about quantum mechanics, I am not a committed
believer in the relative state interpretation.
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Abstract. A crucial distinction in discussions of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics (MWI) is that between versions of the interpretation positing a physical multiplicity 
of worlds, and those in which the multiplicity is merely psychological, and due to the splitting 
of consciousness upon interaction with amplified quantum superpositions. It is argued that 
Everett’s original version of the MWI belongs to the latter class, and that most of the 
criticisms leveled against the MWI, in particular that it is illogical or incoherent, are not valid 
against such “psychological multiplicity” versions. Attempts to derive the quantum-mechanical 
probabilities from the many-worlds interpretation are reviewed, and Everett’s initial derivation 
is extended to show that these are the unique possible probabilities. But there remains a 
challenge for proponents of the MWI: to show that their interpretation requires probabilities, 
rather than merely nonprobabilistic indeterminacy. 
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Introduction. While it has enjoyed some popularity, particularly among cosmologists, the 
relative state or many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (henceforth MWI) appears 
to have fallen into disfavor among those concerned with the problem of interpreting quantum 
theory. D'Espagnat (1976) has criticized the theory in his seminal book, and Wheeler (1977), 
one of the best known proponents, has renounced it. Bell has said that "...the many-universes 
interpretation is a kind of heuristic, simplified theory, which people have done on the backs 
of envelopes but haven't really thought through. When you do try to think it through it is 
not coherent." (Bell, interviewed in Davies and Brown (1986)), and his view appears fairly 
widespread. Even among those who view the MWI as consistent, virtually no-one anymore 
believes with Everett that it shows that "the Schrodinger equation formalism yields its own 
interpretation." The major objective of this paper is to show that despite such criticism, the 
MWI is indeed a coherent and consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics arising naturally 
from the Schrodinger formalism, by developing a "psychological" version of the MWI in 
which the multiplicity of "worlds" appears as a multiplicity of perspectives on a single 
physical reality as seen from the points of view of different conscious subsystems' of this 
physical reality. This physical reality will be described by the usual quantum mechanical 
apparatus of a Hilbert-space statevector evolving over time according to the Schrodinger 
equation, with no extra physical structure introduced to account for "branching universes," and 
will be shown to give rise to the multiplicity of "worlds." It will also be shown to imply that 
there is only one acceptable probability distribution over them, which coincides with the 
quantum mechanical one. 
The term 'subsystem' is here meant in its general sense, not necessarily in its 
special quantum mechanical sense of one factor of a tensor product of Hilbert 
spaces. 
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Sections 1 and 2 provide preliminaries, with section 1 reviewing the reasons for 
wanting an interpretation, such as the MWI, based solely on the Schrodinger equation and 
rejecting the projection postulate, and section 2 setting forth a variety of such interpretations, 
including different possible "many-worlds" interpretations, for comparison with the 
"psychological" version of the MWI which is the main subject of the paper. Section 3 
develops this psychological version in detail, and argues that it coincides with Everett's views, 
while sections 4 and 5 develop it further by comparing its approach to psychological unity 
through time and across subspaces of Hilbert space to that of other versions of the MWI-- 
in the process setting to rest the fear, expressed by Bell (1981), that the MWI indulges in 
"solipsism of the present moment." Section 6 reviews criticisms of the MWI and attempts to 
answer them in the light of the psychological version. Sections 7 through 9 take up the 
question of the relationship between the MWI and the probabilities defined by the Born 
interpretation of the wavefunction. The key points in the discussion are section 8's argument 
that the Born probabilities constitute the only permissible probability distribution over different 
"worlds" corresponding to different observed experimental outcomes, and section 9's argument 
that we cannot yet rule out the possibility of nonprobabilistic indeterminacy. A variety of 
considerations bearing on the choice between the MWI and other "no-statevector-reduction" 
interpretations are noted as they arise throughout the paper, and some are touched on again 
in the concluding section. But the main thrust of the paper is that whatever such 
considerations may suggest about the choice between the MWI and other interpretations, the 
only problem with the consistency or coherence of the MWI lies in the need to arbitrarily 
postulate that the indeterminacy of which branch of the statevector one will end up in is of 
a probabilistic, rather than nonprobabilistic nature. The lack of an argument for this postulate 
based in the MWI itself, remains an obstacle to the claim that the MWI provides a consistent, 
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coherent interpretation of quantum mechanics which can generate the quantum mechanical 
predictions from the Schrodinger equation formalism without any extra structure or postulates. 
1. Reduction, Schrodinger Evolution, and the Many-Worlds Interpretation. The MWI can 
be viewed as an attempt to answer the question: why don't we observe superpositions of 
macroscopically different states? Schrodinger pointed out, with his cat example, that the 
Schrodinger equation implied that such states could be prepared. The "orthodox" 
interpretation's answer to the question of why we don't observe them was to postulate a mode 
of time evolution distinct from the continuous, unitary linear evolution according to the 
Schrodinger equation, that applied whenever a measurement was made on a system, throwing 
it from a superposition into one of the eigenvectors of the measured observable (with 
probabilities given by the squares of the amplitudes of the components of the statevector 
expanded in terms of these eigenvectors). This "collapse" or "reduction of the wavepacket" 
creates several difficulties. Particularly bothersome are: (1) there is no rigorous, physical 
specification of the conditions under which collapse, rather than Schrodinger evolution, occurs, 
and (2) gedankenexperiments in which one tests whether collapse has occurred by looking for 
the interference between the superposed alternatives which, on a view rejecting reduction, 
would persist after measurement, suggest such interference would be observed.2 In (2), I am 
thinking specifically of the reversal of the Stern-Gerlach experiment. (For classic discussions 
of this, see Wigner (1967) and Bohm (1951); for a modern treatment, see Englert, Scully, and 
Schwinger (1988) and even permutations thereof (1988), (1989)J While it has been argued 
Other difficulties are: (3) the orthodox view seems to require the postulation 
of a non-quantum-mechanically described outside system "observing" a quantum 
mechanical system, creating difficulties describing the whole universe in quantum- 
mechanical terms, and (4) it is probably not possible to describe the "reduction of 
a statevector" in a Lorentz-invariant way (see Aharonov and Albert (1980, 1981)). 
2 
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that thermodynamic considerations make even the partial reversal of macroscopic measurements 
impracticable (Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi (1962); Peres (1980))’ that does not resolve the 
issue of principle. 
What inclines us to accept reduction, rather than continual Schrodinger evolution, is that 
we don’t directly observe macroscopic superpositions. One might make an acceptable theory 
by making physically precise the conditions under which reduction occurs, either by describing 
an instant where it occurs, or by slightly modifying the Schrijdinger equation so that it remains 
as it is for microscopic phenomena unobserved by macroscopic apparatus, but shades 
(continuously?) into statevector reduction as the system interacts with larger and larger apparati 
capable of correlating its state with more and more macroscopic phenomena. Either of these 
possibilities are in principle, experimentally distinguishable from pure Schrodinger evolution. 
But if we can find an interpretation of the quantum mechanical apparatus of state-vector and 
Schrodinger equation which implies that we won’t observe macroscopic superpositions, then 
we won’t have to assume reduction. Both Bohm’s (1952) theory (which adds a bit to the 
quantum mechanical apparatus, but doesn’t alter its experimental implications) and the MWI 
are attempts to do this, in different ways. 
2. Different Versions of the MWI and Related Interpretations. Different proponents of 
the MWI present different versions, and are not always clear about what they have in mind. 
But clarity about one’s interpretation and the assumptions behind it are essential to an adequate 
assessment of it. I will therefore outline several possible versions of the MWI, and some 
related interpretations which will help clarify the MWI by contrast and which I regard as its 
closest competitors. All of them attempt to solve the measurement problem by rejecting 
statevector reduction. Some of these versions were suggested by the incisive analysis of Bell 
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(1981) but I will concentrate on a distinction which Bell neglected, that between "physical" 
and "psychological" interpretations of the multiplicity of worlds. 
(A) The first version of the MWI is the simplest, and perhaps the closest to Everett's. The 
structure of the physical world corresponds just to the statevector in Hilbert space, evolving 
according to the Schrodinger equation. The multiplicity of "worlds" is really a multiplicity 
of consciousnesses, not a multiplicity of physical systems, and the "branching" that occurs is 
also an essentially psychological process that occurs when a consciousness observes a 
superposed system: the conscious system goes into superposition, as the Schrodinger equation 
implies, but thereby splits into several consciousnesses. There is no multiplication of physical 
worlds, only a complexification of the structure of the statevector of the universe, which has 
differentiated so as to support, indeed given the psychological conditions for the unity of 
consciousness to require, several consciousnesses where before there was only one. This 
interpretation will be my primary focus, and I will expound it at length below. (It might be 
clearer to call this the Relative State Interpretation, reserving the term 'Many-Worlds' for 
physical-multiplicity interpretations like B and C below; I refer to both types of interpretations 
as versions of the MWI, since this has become the established practice.) 
(B) Realism about the statevector as above, plus the statement that there is a physical 
multiplicity of worlds. The square modulus of the projection of the statevector on an 
eigenvector of an observable Z is stipulated to give us the proportion (or relative measure) of 
worlds in which a measurement of that observable yields the corresponding eigenvalue. (The 
usual probability assertions of quantum mechanics may then be derived from the assumption 
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that we are equally likely to be in any one of the existing worlds). Deutsch (interviewed in 
Davies and Brown (1986)) may have in mind something of this sort. 
(C)  Interpretation B, with the stipulation that the worlds that exist correspond to position 
eigenvectors; this is essentially Bell's (198 1)  version of Everett's (1957a,b) MWI. This gets 
rid of the difficulty with (B), that it introduces "observation" into the fundamental physics 
again in the choice of an observable whose eigenvectors determine the nature of the physically 
different worlds. 
(D) Interpretation (B), plus a linking of particular worlds at one time with worlds at other 
times, into physical trajectories. Just how to select which worlds get linked into trajectories 
is a problem seemingly susceptible to many solutions; one desirable criterion might be an 
"anti-solipsism" requirement: that what is in our memory of "events at time t-1" at time t, 
correspond to what happened in this branch at time t-1. (It would seem there is no way we 
could observationally distinguish theories which violate this requirement from those that don't, 
however.) A great variety of specifications of trajectories may be possible; a particularly 
interesting specification gives rise to trajectories like those in the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave 
model. 
(E) B, but with the various worlds being merely possible worlds, and the real world being 
chosen with a distribution llv(z)I12 out of the class of possible worlds, where z ranges over 
the eigenvalues of the relevant observable Z. This is another of Bell's suggestions, though 
it is of course no longer a many-worlds interpretation. 
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(F) Like (E), but at each moment the actual world is chosen out of the comparison class of 
possible worlds with distribution lIw(x) 112, where x ranges over the eigenvalues of position. 
(G) Like (D), but there is a single actual trajectory. For a particular choice of form for the 
trajectories, interpretation G becomes the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory of Bohm (1952). 
E,F, and G are of course not many-worlds theories (I would call them all hidden- 
variable theories); A through D are. 
Do any of these interpretations correspond to the classic expositions of the MWI by 
Everett, DeWitt and others (De Witt, and Graham 1973)? Despite formalized expositions like 
Everett's "relative state" formulation, the MWI is commonly thought to be rather unclear. The 
root of the unclarity is Everett's claim that the MWI is the natural interpretation of the 
quantum apparatus of statevector and Schrodinger equation, to which it adds nothing. This 
has seemed to conflict with talk of "branching universes" which appear to be an added 
structure imposed on the evolving statevector, since after all components of statevectors are 
not linked through time in the quantum formalism in any kind of tree structure. Moreover, 
if the additional structure really is a branching tree, the problem of reduction of the 
wavepacket has not really been avoided, but merely reformulated: the splitting of a universe 
appears to be basically the same process as reduction, with all the same problems as to when, 
precisely, it occurs. These difficulties stem from a fundamental ambivalence among critics and 
some proponents of the MWI about whether the "many worlds" reflect a physical multiplicity 
of universes, or simply a division of consciousnesses within one physical system. I will 
argue that Everett explicitly endorsed the latter view. 
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3. Version (A) of the MWI: Psychological Multiplicity Without Physical Multiplicity. 
3.1 Psychophysical parallelism. The MWI as presented by Everett is an attempt to interpret 
the statevector and Schrodinger equation without any extra mathematical formalism (and in 
particular, without the either the projection postulate or a physical multiplicity of worlds). I 
read Everett as endorsing version (A) of the MWI. On this reading there is one universe, 
represented by a statevector, which may however be a superposition of infinitely many 
macroscopically or microscopically different states. Evolution of this state vector is always 
according to the Schrodinger equation. To the question "Why don't we observe macroscopic 
superpositions like Schrodinger's cat?" a simple reply may be given. One system measures 
(observes, if it is conscious) another when its state becomes correlated with the other's through 
Schrodinger evolution. That is, letting y' represent the apparatus (or observer) state and $ 
represent the observed system state, when the state of the total system A + S evolves from 
~ o @ ( ~ l ~ ' , )  to ~,(tfI@u/s,). (v", represents the initial, nonregistering state of the apparatus, 
while the VI are distinct states which may be thought of as pointer positions (or states in 
which the observer sees a definite pointer position) or the like.) In attempting to observe a 
macroscopic superposition like Schrodinger's cat, my state would become correlated with the 
cat's, and I would go into a superposition of states "me seeing a dead cat" and "me seeing 
a live cat." Such a macroscopic superposition does not possess the necessary unity to be a 
"state of consciousness" (using 'state' in a non-QM sense here). Therefore what happens is 
my consciousness splits into two consciousnesses, for the components "me seeing a dead cat" 
and "me seeing a live cat," which are both elements of physical reality, do possess the unity 
required to be states of consciousness. And these components (and their subsequent histories, 
until their next encounters with amplified quantum phenomena) moreover possess the necessary 
continuity (of memory-contents, e.g.) with earlier and later states to form the history of a 
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consciousness persisting through time-- with the one bizarre aspect that when I observe an 
amplified quantum superposition (when I interact with it via a Hamiltonian which correlates 
components of my state to components of the superposition) my consciousness splits or forks 
into many branches. (Theoretically, though as a practical matter it would be impossible, 
someone could perform on me the analog of the reversal of the Stern-Gerlach experiment, and 
the branches could join again, but in such a process the results of measurement would be 
erased from my memory(s)--along, perhaps, with everything else that happened between the 
splitting and rejoining.) These branches are branches of my consciousness, and the branching 
is not a physical process, but one that occurs because of the conditions for personal identity, 
or identity of consciousness, which are more matters of philosophy or psychology than physics. 
It may seem strange to invoke psychological or philosophical criteria in explaining the 
results of physical processes, but it is not really. Any physical theory needs some crude 
account of how the theory links up with our observations, in order to be of interest to US 
(though of course the theory's meaning is not exhausted by statements about observations). 
These include crude theories about our eyes, bodies, sense-organs, and how they perceive what 
they do. Advocates of the MWI could argue that in order to get theory properly related to 
observation (part of interpreting the theory or mathematical formalism) in quantum mechanics, 
we simply need a slightly more sophisticated "stylized psychology" which takes into account 
conditions for the unity of conscious experience. This does not mix psychology into physical 
theory, so that we need psychological concepts like mind in the statement of the basic physical 
theory; we simply need to know a bit about the way psychological states supewene on 
physical states in order to get the observational implications of the basic physical theory 
(which however contains no psychological concepts) right. By contrast, it might be argued 
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that some proponents of versions of the more "orthodox" interpretation of QM, with the 
reduction postulate, do invoke psychological concepts at the level of basic physical theory: 
for example Wigner (1967, 1976), who suggests (in part because of his acceptance of the 
reverse S tern-Gerlach argument against early reduction of the statevector) that reduction must 
not be a purely physical process, but must rather be an effect of nonphysical mind on matter. 
This sort of thing is worrisome in physical theory (particularly as we have no precise way of 
deciding when we are in the presence of a "mind" or Cartesian "soul"), but the MWI is not 
guilty of it. 
3.2 Everett as a Subscriber to Version (A) 
Everett spends a lot of time on formalized relative state theory, and relatively little on 
the assumptions about psychophysical parallelism which I have argued are crucial to the 
success of the MWI. It is these assumptions which give certain "relative states" (states 
relative to particular states of conscious observers) their interest as potential "worlds" from the 
point of view of particular consciousnesses. Among supporters of the MWI, Zeh is most 
explicit about this: "The different components represent two completely decoupled worlds.. .. 
As the "other" component cannot be observed any more, it serves only to save the consistency 
of quantum theory .... This interpretation, corresponding to a "localization of consciousness" 
not only in space and time, but also in certain Hilbert-space components, has been suggested 
by Everett ..." (Zeh 1970) Everett himself, while stressing the importance of psychophysical 
parallelism and of representing the observer as a physical system within the theory, does not 
explicitly discuss the role of conditions for the unity of consciousness. There are strong hints 
that the view sketched above is implicit in his thought, however: 
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We thus arrive at the following picture: Throughout all of a sequence 
of observation processes there is only one physical system representing the 
observer, yet there is no single unique state of the observer (which follows from 
the representations of interacting systems). Nevertheless, there is a 
representation in terms of a superposition, each element of which contains a 
definite observer state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each 
succeeding observation (or interaction), the observer state "branches" into a 
number of different states. Each branch represents a different outcome of the 
measurement and the corresponding eigenstate for the object-system state. All 
branches exist simultaneously in the superposition after any given sequence of 
observations. (Everett 1957a) 
In a footnote, he adds "This total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies 
that no observer will ever be aware of any "splitting" process. 
This passage is somewhat ambiguous, and I suspect different interpretations of it and 
passages like it (Everett 1957b, p. 62n.) have given rise to many different suppositions about 
what Everett's MWI really is. One thing that suggests the splitting is a psychological splitting 
of consciousness, rather than some sort of physical splitting of one world into many, is that 
Everett clearly says that "the observer state "branches"" rather than, say, "the universe 
"branches"." That Everett always puts the terms 'split' and 'branch' in quotes suggests the 
same thing. Also, Everett states that throughout the process, there is only one physical system 
representing the observer. 
4. Psychological Unity Through Time in Various Versions of the MWI. Bell's 
strongest objection to the MWI is that he believes it implies a "solipsism of the present 
moment," in that the MWI shows that for an observer in given branch of the statevector at 
a given time, all of his memory-contents will be (statistically speaking) consistent with the 
usual quantum-mechanical predictions, but, Bell believes, there is no linking up of these time- 
slices of consciousnesses into histories: no guarantee that the "I" that has certain experiment- 
results recorded in its memory actually had those experiences (Bell 1981). Although Everett's 
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scheme implies the existence of an "I" at a previous time who had those experiences, Bell 
thinks there is no physical identification of this "I" with the current "I" who remembers the 
experiences. I think this problem stems from a misunderstanding of the relative importance 
of physics and psychology/philosophy in the MWI. The primary aim of the MWI was 
precisely to show that an interpretation of QM observationally indistinguishable from the 
orthodox one could be constructed by adding to the Schrodinger equation formalism only some 
assumptions about psychological or philosophical criteria for identity of consciousness. A 
minimal way of attempting this gives rise to Bell's time-slices. But if we have qualms about 
the metaphysical sparseness of the world thus construed, we may add additional suppositions 
about criteria for identity of consciousness through time, and recover a world of persisting 
(though branching) individual consciousnesses whose current memory-contents are generally 
reliable indicators of past experiences. (Moreover, we can get this unification through time 
whether we have a type (A), (B), or ( C )  version of the MWI: that is, whether one supposes 
the multiplicity of worlds at any given time is physical or psychological.) Thus if we want 
to require (1) some degree of physical causal connectedness and (2) some degree of 
consistency of content, such that memories generally correspond to earlier experiences, as 
conditions for identity of consciousness through time, we can link up the "right" components 
of the statevector into consciousnesses with branching histories, which are not solipsistic in 
the way Bell was worried about. Each component of the universal statevector at time t is 
causally linked to components at later times (requirement l), and some of these later 
components share enough conscious content (requirement 2) that they may be linked into a 
conscious history. It is a mistake to suppose that physics should be expected to supply the 
extra structure which ensures these trajectories link up. (Though if the physics does add 
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trajectories, as in (D), we will want them to be the right ones for psychological continuity.) 
At one point Bell likens Bohm's theory to the MWI plus trajectories (and of course, 
the singling out of one trajectory as the physically real one). He sees a major advantage for 
Bohm's theory in the specification, in the physics, of a trajectory--a single history for the 
world, which provides a basis for rejecting solipsism. Presumably the idea is that now I know 
I am identical with the previous person whom physics says existed and had experiences I now 
remember having, because there aren't all these other "versions of me" in other universes who 
I might worry that I'm really, metaphysically continuous with rather than the one whose 
experiences I remember. But this problem isn't unique to the MWI (There are other people 
even in a single branch of this universe and how, after all, do I know I wasn't really, 
metaphysically one of them a few seconds ago, instead of the person whose experiences I 
remember? How do I know I was really, metaphysically ANYBODY a few seconds ago, even 
if there are no other "versions of me in other branches of the universe" to worry about?). I 
think Bell is here expecting physics to solve puzzles which it need not solve. Finally, it is 
important that we can introduce psychological "trajectories" in version (A), since as I will 
show in Section 8, this is useful in the derivation of the correct probabilities from version (A), 
a crucial part of any argument for the observational indistinguishability of version (A) from 
standard quantum mechanics. 
5. Psychological Unity and Multiplicity Across Subspaces of Hilbert Space in Various 
Versions of the MWI. The considerations of the previous sections suggest two ways of 
viewing the measurement process, corresponding to different views of the psychophysical 
relationship between brains in different Hilbert-space components and consciousnesses. In one, 
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there is a single consciousness before the interaction, splitting into several afterwards. In the 
other, there are the same number of consciousnesses before and after the interaction: one for 
each component of the Hilbert space decomposition in terms of eigenvectors of the relevant 
observable. Everett appears to plump for the former, and it indeed version (A) of the MWI 
appears to provide no basis for a psychological multiplicity of consciousnesses before 
measurement. In the case of type (B) or (C) theories, which have physical mutiplicity but no 
trajectories, one might imagine either that consciousness unifies across physically distinct 
worlds in which its state is identical, or that it remains numerically distinct. 
6. Critics of the MWI. 
6.1 Bell. Bell's views on Everett, as I have suggested above, provide an example of how an 
excessively physical interpretation of Everett's statements about "branching" and "multiple 
worlds" can lead to trouble. Bell's view of Everett's theory is summarized in the statement 
that: 
The Everett (?) theory of this section will simply be the pilot-wave 
theory without trajectories. Thus instantaneous classical configurations x are 
supposed to exist, and to be distributed in the comparison class of possible 
worlds with probability lh@ll. But no pairing of configurations at different 
times, as would be effected by the existence of trajectories, is supposed. (Bell 
198 1) 
Bell then makes a series of points, labelled (A) through (D), about how this Everett (?) 
theory seems to differ from what Everett (and/or DeWitt) actually say. I think it is fair to 
say that Bell supposes a coherent version of the Everett theory must differ from what Everett 
and DeWitt seem to 'be saying on these four points. But in my view, Bell misinterprets 
Everett, at least, on these points, precisely because he takes his statements too physically. 
Bell's point (A) is that it is unnecessary to multiply worlds. Bell begins by making 
what I have taken to be the main point of the MWI, that "The psychophysical parallelism 
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is supposed such that our representatives in a given "branch" universe are aware only of what 
is going on in that branch." But he goes on: "Now it seems to me that this multiplication 
of universes is extravagant, and serves no real purpose in the theory, and can simply be 
dropped without repercussions. So I see no reason to insist on this particular difference 
between the Everett theory and the pilot-wave theory-- where, although the wave is never 
reduced, only one set of values of the variables x is realized at any instant." Now this is 
an interesting point--that one could throw out all worlds but one, and if it were true that one 
would lose nothing essential, one might want to do it. Everett and DeWitt believe that one 
does lose something; the existence of all branches is essential to the Everett-DeWitt-Graham 
demonstrations, discussed by Bell under (C), that one can recover the Born statistical 
interpretation from the formalism itself. Since Bell thinks this demonstration is unsuccessful, 
I assume he therefore isn't worried about losing this. From his point of view, both the 
hidden variables interpretations and the MWI have to make an additional assumption 
introducing the correct probability measure. Bell's Everett(?) (and Bohm) do indeed add 
such an assumption about the selection of the actual world from an ensemble of possible 
worlds with probability measure on that ensemble given by Ilv211. Moreover for Bell, who 
sees both the MWI and de Broglie-Bohm as introducing a structure of "worlds" or 
trajectories in addition to the statevector, we can remove the other worlds from this extra 
structure without losing the possibilities of interference present in the statevector; for Everett, 
the statevector is all there is, and we cannot get rid of these other worlds without destroying 
these interference possibilities. 
Another problem is discussed by Bell under (B): 
it could be said that the classical variables x do not appear in Everett and 
DeWitt. However it is taken for granted there that meaningful reference can 
be made to experiments having yielded one result rather than another. SO 
instrument readings, or the numbers on computer output, and things like that, 
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are the classical variables of the theory. We have argued already against the 
appearance of such vague quantities at a fundamental level ..... It was for this 
reason that the hypothesis was made of fundamental variables x, from which 
instrument readings and so on can be construct ed.... I suspect Everett and 
DeWitt wrote as if instrument readings were fundamental only in order to be 
intelligible to specialists in quantum measurement theory. (Bell 198 1). 
This is closely related to another problem: that to specify a probability distribution 
over "worlds" we must choose a preferred operator, so that the components of the statevector 
along its eigenvectors can be taken as the set of "points" on which the measure is defined. 
But for Everett, the different "worlds" are not physically defined "configurations" (Bell's 
Everett(?)) or "trajectories" (de Broglie-Bohm), but are worlds-for-consciousnesses. I stress 
here the fact of consciousness, not the macroscopic nature of instruments. Macroscopic 
superpositions exist; we just cannot, in the nature of things, perceive them. Instrument 
readings are important because they are observed by consciousnesses. Thus while the 
division into worlds is indeed dependent on vague, nonphysical concepts like consciousness, 
these concepts are not imported into the basic physics or the mathematical formalism, 
because the grouping of Hilbert-space components into distinct worlds is not a phenomenon 
at that level (though it could be said to have a basis at that level in the possibility of 
superposition inherent in the QM formalism). Therefore, there is no need in the basic 
physical formalism to choose a preferred observable whose eigenvectors determine the nature 
of the various "worlds." 
(C) is the contention that Everett/de Witt do not succeed in deriving the desired 
probability measure over final configurations from the QM formalism. "Everett has to attach 
weights to the different branches of his multiple universe, and in the same way [as Bohm] 
does so in proportion to the norms of the relevant parts of the wave function. Everett and 
De Witt seem to regard this choice as inevitable. I am unable to see why, although of 
course it is a perfectly reasonable choice with several nice properties." (Bell 1981). This 
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point is very important, since if we can't get the right probabilities straight from the physical 
formalism then we will have to add something to it, which will probably require mention of 
a particular decomposition of the statevector into worlds and explicit specification of a 
measure over those worlds, thus requiring the extra structure of Bohm and Bell's "classical 
configuration variables x." The validity of Bell's contention, and of various attempted 
derivations of the probability measure by MWI proponents, are considered at length in 
sections 7-9 below. 
(D) is the question of trajectories and branching. I have already indicated that 
branching is not a process represented in the fundamental physics, and Bell is mistaken to 
attribute to Everett the view that it is represented there. Bell also mentions "the [lack of] 
association of a particular present with a particular past". I have already discussed this as 
well: one may suppose such association occurs in the unification of consciousness, rather 
than by explicitly putting trajectories in terms of "configuration variables" into the physics. 
6.2 Wheeler, Wigner, and d'Espagnat. Aside from Bell's, the most influential criticisms 
of the MWI have probably been those of Wheeler, Wigner, and d'Espagnat. The portions 
of their criticisms which are relevant to version (A) of the MWI are quite similar. They 
object to the existence of branches of the statevector in which "we" have experiences 
different from those we actually have. Thus Wheeler: 
...g reat difficulties would seem to arise in giving any well defined meaning to 
the term 'state of memory of the observer'. Thus as Bohr always emphasized, 
any attempt to "push the analysis of the mechanism of living organisms [Le. 
the consciousness as ultimate observing device] as far as that of atomic 
phenomena ... would doubtless kill [the] animal" [and thus wipe out that very 
consciousness]. (Wheeler 1977. Brackets Wheeler's). 
He then cites Wigner and d'Espagnat. Now it is likely that an attempt to view the 
consciousness as part of the quantum-system, and, say, to try to reverse a conscious Stern- 
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Gerlach measurement would, even theoretically within the MWI, wipe out that observer's 
memory of what went on between the measurement and its reversal (though not necessarily 
the observer-- if one assumes enough finesse to reverse a conscious Stern-Gerlach 
measurement, one might as well assume enough finesse to keep the observer alive in the 
process). But this does not invalidate the theory. And if one arranged to have it done on 
oneself, one might well know after reversal, that one had been in a superposition (statevector 
reduction had not occurred), because of the memory gap. Whereas if reduction had occurred, 
one would be unable to reverse the measurement and might remain conscious of the 
measurement result. 
Wigner shows some awareness of the psychological basis of the MWI, as he argues: 
The epistemology under discussion postulates that I feel to be in only one of 
the immensely many states in the linear combination of which I actually am. 
This means, however, that the other states, and hence the total state vector of 
the world, are meaningless. 
One could postulate, in a similar vein, that the world is homogeneous 
and isotropic and it is only I who sees differences between different locations 
and different directions--the real state vector is invariant under all Poincare 
transformations. Such ideas appear to me--perhaps wrongly--to be detached 
from reality. (Wigner 1973). 
There is an equivocation on 'I' in the first sentence, between 'I' as whichever consciousness 
I happen to wind up with after measurement, and 'I' as the physical subsystem which gets 
thrown into superposition after measurement. There is no ground for calling the other states 
meaningless except an extreme positivism in which only measurement results are real. 
There are many reasons to reject such a positivism and try to find a realistic interpretation 
of physical theory, and the justification for introducing the "meaningless" other branches into 
the MWI is that they enable a realistic (and non-hidden-variables) interpretation of QM. 
Superpositions are necessary in order to explain interference phenomena; in this regard they 
are unlike the hypothetical supposition of homogeneity and isotropy of the real statevector 
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to which Wigner compares them in the last paragraph: the latter doesn't help explain 
anything. 
D'Espagnat (1976, Chapter 23) deals with two versions of the MWI, his "solution (a)" 
and "solution (b)." Solution (a) roughly corresponds to a physical multiplicity view, my (B) 
or (C), to which d'Espagnat objects because of the need to choose a preferred observable. 
Solution (b) is one in which "the number of instruments and the number of systems is 
always conserved." It would therefore appear to correspond to my version (A), but 
d'Espagnat does not appear to recognize the need for a psychological interpretation of the 
split. 
Thus we are led to the conclusion that, if the impressions of the observers are 
just physical properties of these systems--and as such, are described by the 
state vectors--then these impressions must be blurred in the kind of 
experiments studied here. This conclusion is, however, in obvious 
contradiction with our immediate experience, since under the conditions of 
these experiments every one of us knows with certainty that he always has the 
definite impression of seeing, or not seeing, a signal. (d'Espagnat 1976, p. 
27 3) 
The problem with d'Espagnat's conclusion (and the argument that leads to it) is the 
assumption that there is a single observer consciousness associated with a single physical 
observer-system and represented in the statevector (the plural in the first sentence refers to 
a hypothetical ensemble of identical universes (d'Espagnat likes to couch his quantum theory 
in terms of ensembles), not to the branches of a statevector within a universe). We cannot 
expect the statevector to be in a "one-to-one correspondence'' with my single impression; 
it corresponds to a multiplicity of impressions, which is not the blurred impression of a 
single consciousness, but the distinct impressions of the multiplicity of consciousnesses which 
my version (A) says must exist after measurement. To expect the objective description of 
physical reality to contain the "fact" that I had this particular impression is like expecting 
it to explain why my consciousness is that of being Howard Bamum, and not of being 
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Bernard d'Espagnat: in both cases the explanation is roughly that various subsystems of 
physical reality with a certain structure exist, some sort of crude psychology tells us that 
each subsystem with such a structure has consciousness, and given that I am going to be a 
consciousness, I have to be one of them and can't be more than one at once, but physics 
has nothing to say about which one3, nor should we expect it to. 
6.3. Thus it would appear that versions (A), (C) or (D) of the MWI remain competitors for 
the de Broglie-Bohm hidden variables theory (a variant of G ) ,  as do hidden variable 
interpretation (F) and other variants of (G). There might seem little to go on in making the 
choice except for metaphysical prejudice (e.g. against unnecessary multiplication of 
consciousnesses, or against "hidden" variables). But there is also the fact that version (A) 
does not have to choose a preferred set of configuration variables-- indeed, does not have 
to add anything to the Schrodinger equation formalism. This may be viewed as an 
advantage or not, depending on whether one agrees with Bell (1982) that "in physics the 
only observations we must consider are position observations ... It is a great merit of the de 
Broglie-Bohm picture to force us to consider this fact. If you make axioms, rather than 
definitions and theorems, about the "measurement" of anything else, then you commit 
redundancy and risk inconsistency." Speculating, one might even relate this to the possibility 
(Wigner 1976) that only a few of the mathematically possible Hermitian operators correspond 
to physically measurable quantities like position and momentum. If this is so, the de 
Broglie-Bohm measurement theory, and perhaps version (C)  of the MWI as well, might 
explain it, while the standard theory and version (A) of the MWI do not. (Though Bohr's 
'hecessity for using classical variables to describe measurement results" could be considered 
3 B ~ t  physics combined with the "stylized psychology" of the MWI may enable us to say 
something about the probabilities of being various consciousnesses, when your current one 
splits due to measurement. See Section 8. 
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a recognition of it). In addition, there is the fact that we have not, as yet, introduced 
probabilities into version (A) of the MWI. If they can be derived from this version which 
does not explicitly mention them, this might be considered an advantage. If they cannot be 
so derived, we must investigate whether they can be coherently introduced by stipulation (as 
they are in the physical multiplicity versions of the MWI). The latter question will be 
investigated in section 7, the former in section 8. 
7. The Status Of Probabilities in Version (A) of the MWI. Let's put aside until the next 
section Everett and DeWitt's contention that the statistical interpretation emerges naturally 
from the formalism, and consider whether we may simply introduce the square-amplitude 
measure as a matter of stipulation. Does it make sense to do so? What does it mean to 
assign probabilities to components of the statevector? If one wants to say it has to do with 
relative frequencies, fine-- but relative frequencies of what? 
Consider several ways probabilities could be included in a physical theory. (1) Under 
certain conditions (unambiguously specified in the theory, one hopes) the theory does not 
predict determinate consequences, but makes a statistical prediction. Le., the equations of 
motion may contain transition probabilities. For example, particles make "random jumps." 
(2) Equations of motion are deterministic, but the initial conditions are probabilistic. This 
could be described by saying the actual physical world is conceived of as chosen from a 
(possibly hypothetical) ensemble of possible worlds, with probabilities given by a certain 
measure. This could be conceived of as (2a)a physically real random process occurring at 
the "beginning of the world" in which initial conditions are "chosen." Or it could perhaps 
be due to (2b)our ignorance of initial conditions. In the latter case one wonders if it is 
proper to call the probabilities part of a genuine physical theory. Perhaps it is, if the 
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physics of the situation explains why we can't know the values and why we should have the 
subjective probabilities we do. Statistical mechanics is one case in point; Bohm (1953) has 
argued that his hidden variable theory is another. 
The MWI does not fit neatly into any of the above categories. With the MWI, there 
are determinate initial conditions (initial statevector) and a deterministic law of evolution, so 
the probabilities must arise from ignorance. But this is not ignorance of an objective 
physical fact, rather it is ignorance as to which branch of the statevector we are in or will 
go into--ignorance of a "perspectival fact". In Everett's version of the MWI (my version (A)) 
the branches "split", rather than being distinct and merely becoming differentiated (section 
5) ,  so that it is not a mere matter of finding out which branch one is in, but a matter of 
finding out which one of the branches one will end up in after the split. There is a genuine 
stochastic event going on; it is, of course, the splitting of one mind into two, as viewed 
from the perspective of one of the resulting conscious histories. The probabilities are 
probabilities that "my" consciousness will go with one branch versus the other; and their 
introduction can be empirically justified by the fact that if we suppose these probabilities 
obtained in previous, similar, situations where Schrodinger evolution predicts a split (quantum 
superpositions amplified to affect conscious minds), we get relative frequencies very close 
to the ones we've actually observed (at least with very high probability, in the limit as the 
number of observations gets large, which is all any interpretation of quantum mechanics can 
promise). These probabilities may be thought of as "objective" as opposed to 
"epistemological" (or as they are sometimes termed, "subjective") probabilities. But they are 
not the probabilities of objective physical events, but rather of outcomes of a sort of 
subjective, psychological, perspectival event, the splitting of consciousness. 
If the splitting 
initially similar worlds 
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of consciousness were simply a matter of physically distinct but 
becoming differentiated, and the probability meant something like the 
relative numbers of various types of these worlds, the physical basis of the probabilities 
would be relatively clear. In these interpretations, the worlds in the "comparison set of 
possible worlds" differ physically, and the probabilities specify a distribution over these 
different physical possibilities. But in version (A), the probabilities may seem ad hoc, 
necessary for agreement with experiment but a nebulous, hard-to-interpret element in a theory 
which is, after all, attempting to remedy orthodox quantum mechanics' unclear and/or 
idealistic view of the world by providing a clear and precise picture of reality. 
The difficulty is not per se that the probabilities are probabilities of perspectival 
events rather than probabilities describing events occurring in the world as seen from no 
particular point of view. It is that we need a coherent picture of how these probabilities of 
perspectival events (e.g. the probability that "my" consciousness will be the one associated 
with the "pointer-indicating-z-spin up" component of the measuring apparatus) are grounded 
in objective physical reality. After all, for other "perspectival facts," one can generally come 
up with a reasonable explanation of why, given the objective physical situation, things 
viewed from here had to look as they did. One can of course derive the probabilities from 
a coherent mathematical structure. But we need to justify the identification of these numbers 
(norms of Hilbert-space components) with probabilities of perspectival events. Since the 
basic formalism is supposed to be nonprobabilistic, this interpretation of Hilbert-space norms 
as probabilities really should arise from the basic structure and the nature of the perspectives 
we can have on it (the notion of splitting consciousnesses), rather than simply being 
stipulated. Thus, Everett, de Witt, and Graham's claims to have derived the probabilities 
from the Schrodinger equation formalism become crucial. 
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8. Deriving the Probabilities From the MWI. 
8.1 Everett's derivation. In deriving the square amplitude measure from the formalism 
Everett's main assumption (1957a,b) is the additivity assumption that if ty = Caityi is the 
component of the wavefunction along the vector w, its measure rn(ty) should equal the sum 
of the measures associated with each of the components in its expansion, X,m(qvi). This 
additivity requirement is justified by a "conservation of probability" argument: we want the 
probability of being in the "trunk" of a particular tree to equal the sum of the probabilities 
of winding up on each of its branches. But this argument appeals to trajectories, which are 
not part of the physical formalism of version (A). One might object therefore that it should 
be applied to versions of the MWI of type (E) rather than type (A). To this I respond that 
the "trajectories" are to be interpreted as the psychological trajectories discussed in section 
4 above. But what grounds do we have to require the additivity property of these 
trajectories? Well, we may ask if the apparatus that tells us which branches there are 
(statevector, Schrodinger equation, and psychological conditions for unity of consciousness) 
tells us anything about these probabilities. Let a "memory-sequence" a = &a2, ..., an) be a 
sequence of observed outcomes of n experiments Note that the sum of probabilities, given 
that I am in the branch corresponding to a memory-sequence a, of going into branches where 
my memory-sequence is a extended by one of the an+,,k where k indexes the possible 
outcomes of the (n+l)th experiment, which is about to be performed, is one. This is a fact 
about the way consciousness unifies through time: physical subsystems (in a nontechnical 
sense) in which one was about to perform a certain experiment unify with later subsystems 
in which that experiment is complete with a certain outcome, to create a consciousness with 
a history (or in this case, a consciousness branching into several consciousnesses with 
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histories). If your consciousness starts out in one such system which then becomes 
correlated with an amplified quantum phenomenon, you can be sure its history will be 
continued on one of the resulting branches. The reasoning is essentially the same as that 
which justifies assuming that the continued existence of a physical body and brain with the 
right relations to one’s body and brain at earlier times ensures one’s continued conscious 
existence. And the conclusion is just Everett’s additivity assumption. 
But Everett’s derivation of a measure also makes the seemingly ad hoc assumption 
that the measure rn of a given component must be a function of its norm ai. (He argues 
that it must be a function of its modulus in fact, since we may simultaneously multiply all 
weights by an arbitrary modulus-one complex phase factor without changing the physical 
system represented). But, we might ask, why not let m be a function from Rk to R, instead 
of R to R, a function of all the weights in a decomposition, or perhaps even a function of 
both weights and eigenvectors? 
8.2 An improvement on Everett’s derivation. To deal with this objection we may keep 
the additivity assumption and replace the remainder of Everett’s derivation with an appeal 
to Gleason’s theorem (Gleason 1957). This theorem states that for each additive measure 
on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H, there is a density operator of the usual 
quantum-mechanical sort, from which the probability measure can be derived in the usual 
way). Gleason’s theorem does not in itself show that we must assign to a system described 
by a statevector w the probabilities described by the corresponding density operator I w)(w I 
(Le. the square amplitudes of the expansion of that statevector in terms eigenvectors of the 
measured operator). So that if we had a one-to-one mapping R from statevectors to density 
operators, we might generate a different probability measure, by assigning to a system with 
statevector w the probabilities corresponding to some density operator other than I w)(w I ,  
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like Q(v). But a simple argument shows that in the MWI, we cannot do this. It is only 
reasonable that if a statevector has a zero projection on the subspace spanned by a certain 
eigenvector, there can be no world corresponding to that subspace in the MWI. (To continue 
our analogy between spatial-region and Hilbert-space subspace localization of consciousness, 
if a certain spacetime region is empty, we can hardly assign consciousness to its contents. 
It seems similarly unreasonable to assign consciousnesses to "empty" subspaces of the Hilbert 
space.) Therefore we must assign probability zero to worlds corresponding to such empty 
subspaces. It follows from the axioms of probability that we must assign probability one to 
a subspace if the statevector lies in that subspace. The only measure satisfying these 
conditions and additivity is the square-amplitude measure corresponding to the statevector. 
(Consider the one-to-one function from H into the space of density operators mentioned 
above. Since density operators are Hermitian, they have real eigenvalues and any density 
operator p can be represented as p = C l p , I ~ l ) ( ~ l I ,  where the vl are an orthonormal basis 
for H and the p, are between 0 and 1 and sum to 1. Letting the actual statevector be called 
v0, and letting the Ivk) be normalized states orthogonal to Iv0) and forming an orthonormal 
basis together with it, we consider measurement of an observable A which has this basis as 
its Set of eigenvectors. Letting oc, be the eigenvalue corresponding to an eigenvector Ivk), 
we require that PA(& I p), the probability that a measurement of A yields a, if the density 
matrix is p (calculated according to the usual rules for deriving probabilities from density 
matrices) is 0 for k # 0, and 1 for k = 0. This means that C,p,II(~kI~l)112 = 0 for k # 0. 
For this to be true, since both the pi and the II(vkIyf,)112 are nonnegative, for each i 
either pI or II(yfktvj)l12 must be zero. Since this is true for all i and k, it means that the 
only Iv,) which can enter the representation of the density matrix with nonzero weight p1 
are those which are orthogonal to all the Ivk) with nonzero k. The only such (normalized) 
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vector is Iyfo), so the only vector which can enter the representation of the density matrix 
isIyfo), the actual statevector. The only allowable density matrix is thus lyfo)(yfoI, the 
density matrix corresponding to the statevector.) We now have an acceptable alternative 
derivation of probabilities from the formalism (stressing the psychological nature of the 
trajectories behind Everett's additivity requirement, and adducing Gleason's theorem and the 
0-1 probability constraints imposed by the MWI). 
8.3 The De-Witt Graham derivation. Even later proponents of the MWI, de Witt and 
Graham in particular, felt Everett's arguments for the square-amplitude probabilities to be 
inadequate, and presented arguments they felt were better. For instance, there is an argument 
attributed by De Witt (1971) to Graham (and well presented in d'Espagnat (1976)). (Everett 
states the result, while laying less stress on it than do DeWitt (1971) and Graham (1973)). 
In this argument, one examines relative frequencies of results in ensembles of identical 
experiments, and shows that in the limit as the number of experiments goes to infinity, the 
difference between the observed frequencies and those predicted by standard QM can be 
made as small as desired, except for a "negligible" set of cases which approaches zero 
measure. The difficulty is that the argument that this set is negligible rests on the fact that 
the component of the statevector corresponding to such cases approaches zero norm, and the 
appropriateness of the norm as a measure of relative probability is precisely what we are 
trying to establish, D'Espagnat seems not to view this as a problem, describing the extra 
assumption "that vectors with zero norm correspond to nonexisting branches" as "very 
natural." This is indeed a natural assumption, but it does not necessarily imply that 
statevectors with very small norm have very small probability, unless one makes the 
additional assumption that the relative probability of a branch is a uniformly continuous 
function of its relative norm, This sounds pretty reasonable, but no argument is given for 
it. A variant of this argument defines a relative frequency operator on infinite tensor 
products of Hilbert spaces, i.e on vectors representing possible outcomes of infinite sequences 
of measurements (and superpositions thereof). Its eigenvalues are shown to be equal to the 
quantum mechanical probabilities. When the formalism is interpreted, this turns out to be 
the same argument as that just given, and the same objection arises when one asks why the 
mathematical idealization of a relative frequency operator on infinite sequences should be 
relevant to actual measurements on finite sequences. 
Graham's objection to Everett is worth quoting at length: 
Everett gives no connection between his measure and the actual operations 
involved in determining a relative frequency, no way in which the value of his 
measure can actually influence the reading of, say, a particle counter. 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to see what significance such a measure 
can have when its implications are completely contradicted by a simple count 
of the worlds involved, worlds that Everett's own work assures us must all be 
on the same footing. 
(To be sure Everett argues that the measure ... is unique. But remember 
that Gleason has shown that the probabilities defined by the Born 
interpretation, considered as a measure on a Hilbert space, are themselves 
unique. Nevertheless this (hopefully) does not deter anyone from inquiring 
into the connection between those probabilities and experiments that measure 
relative frequency.) (Graham 1973). 
Graham then makes roughly the point I made in the previous paragraph about the 
DeWitt-Graham-Everett demonstration that relative frequencies converge on the quantum 
mechanical probabilities: that it relies on the probability measure it is intended to derive. 
Now Graham's objection that "those probabilities" (in Gleason's theorem) or "[Everett's] 
measure" are not immediately connected with "experiments that measure relative frequency" 
requires some subtlety in its interpretation. If the claim is that the square-amplitude 
probabilities need to be related to relative frequencies, then the DeWitt-Graham-Everett 
argument does as well as can be expected. Any attempt to require an interpretation of 
probabilities in terms of limits of relative frequencies will run up against the problem that 
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these limits turn out to be plims-- probability limits-- so we are stuck with probabilities as 
primitives. That is no reason to reject a particular use of probability theory such as 
Everett's. 
An alternative interpretation of Graham's objection would be that it is not so much 
the transition from probability to relative frequency as the transition from measure to 
probability that is questionable. The formalism allows one to define this square-amplitude 
measure, but who says it tells us anything about probabilities of events? Maybe these events 
just happen, and there are no probabilities. Although we could assume these particular 
probabilities (and, given the above argument for the uniqueness of the square-amplitude 
measure, no others) we are not forced to assume any probabilities, so their introduction is 
"going beyond the formalism," as surely as in versions (C) or (D) or de Broglie-Bohm. AS 
DeWitt (1971) says: "although reality as a whole is completely deterministic, our own little 
corner of it suffers from indeterminism. The interpretation of the quantum mechanical 
formalism (and hence the proof of Everett's metatheorem) is complete only when we show 
that this indeterminism is nevertheless limited by rigorous statistical laws." By examining 
the way our own little corner fits into the whole, we can apparently derive what those 
statistical laws would have to be, but it is not clear we can derive that such laws must 
apply, unless we are willing to argue that we must assign probabilities when there is a 
unique acceptable distribution .4 
4Graham (1973) has attempted to derive the quantum mechanical probabilities for 
experiments measuring macroscopic observables by using the quantum statistical-mechanical 
assumption of equal a priori probabilities and random phases for eigenstates. If we are 
willing to accept that consciousness is necessarily a macroscopic phenomenon, then this 
argument, if valid, would allow us to base the probabilities on foundations no less secure 
than those of statistical mechanics. However, the major justification for the Gibbs principle 
is that the statistical mechanics constructed from it works, empirically. Perhaps the fact that 
the quantum mechanical probabilities derived from the mere assumption that we must have 
some probabilities also work empirically, makes that assumption equally secure, so that there 
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9. The Option of Refraining From Assigning Probabilities. The option of claiming that 
the MWI formalism still gives us no picture of how these probabilities of perspectival events 
arise, and perhaps even no grounds for assuming such probabilities exist, could correspond 
to "complete ignorance"or "true uncertainty" in the decision-theoretic sense (Luce and Raiffa 
(1957, pp. 12, 275-8)), or as I will call it, "nonprobabilistic indeterminacy". 
There are several possible arguments against this. 
(1) Assuming there are no probabilities makes the theory empirically inapplicable, 
while the mere assumption that there are some probabilities, plus the Schriidinger 
equation/statevector formalism, yields the empirically correct probabilities. If we take this 
approach, we fail to explain what it is about the underlying reality described by the MWI 
that makes us choose the probabilistic, rather than the nonprobabilistic, version of the MWI. 
Furthermore, nonprobabilistic indeterminacy may not be very useful for making predictions, 
but as I shall argue below, it is not empirically inapplicable. 
(2) Nonprobabilistic indeterminacy is necessarily "subjective" in the sense of 
"subjective (i.e. epistemological) probability." It therefore does not apply here, where the 
probabilities, as argued in section 7, are "objective" probabilities (though of "subjective", i.e. 
perspectival, events). This is to claim that nonprobabilistic indeterminacy is always a matter 
of having no clue about the real probability distribution (possibly degenerate), which always 
exists. The only justification for not assigning a single distribution would be suspension of 
judgement between a number of possible distributions. But the uncertainty in the many- 
worlds account of measurement is not due to our ignorance of something now determined. 
There is no "fact of the matter" before a measurement, about which branch I will go into, 
any more than there is a "fact of the matter," (except perhaps in some abstruse metaphysical 
is no need to appeal to statistical mechanics and require consciousness to be macroscopic. 
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sense) what the outcome of a measurement will be on a statevector-reduction view. The 
probabilities (or the uncertainty, if we refuse to assign probabilities) are as good as our 
knowledge could possibly be, theoretically, and in that sense "objective". (See Section 7.) 
A variant of this argument points out that these events are repeatable, and thus not the kind 
of "unique event" which it is sometimes argued is the proper context for nonprobabilistic 
indeterminacy. 
I believe this argument is simply wrong. One might cite, for example, the existence 
of infinite sequences with no limits of relative frequencies to buttress the possibility that 
"objective" nonprobabilistic indeterminacy could really exist. To counter this, one could 
argue that such sequences may result (though with probability zero-- which does not mean 
impossibility) from probabilistic processes. And one might argue that no finite amount of 
data can convince us we face such an objective nonprobabilistic indeterministic process, 
rather than a probabilistic one. Nonprobabilistic indeterminacy would then be acceptable 
only as a description of our ignorance in situations where we must act without adequate 
data-- never as part of a description of the world which is a candidate for a scientific theory, 
viewed as potentially standing up to indefinite amounts of further data collection. Since the 
MWI is viewed as a candidate for a (possibly final) scientific theory, and since the 
measurements situations which create (perspectival) indeterminacy within it are repeatable, 
we would have to view these measurements as situations of probabilistic indeterminacy. 
The problem with this is that we can in theory have perfectly good evidence that we 
are facing a nonprobabilistic indeterminate process, even on the basis of a finite amount of 
data. With an infinite amount of data, we might of course have a sequence with no limit 
of relative frequency, and since this has zero probability on any probabilistic hypothesis, we 
would be justified in assuming a nonprobabilistic process-- which has nothing to say about 
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the probability of the data, of course, but at least doesn't assign it probability zero. But 
there are also finite data sets which justify the inference that it is extremely unlikely they 
were produced by a probabilistic process. For instance, divide the data into two sets of 
roughly equal size by some previously chosen, data-independent rule. If (for large amounts 
of data N) the relative frequencies in the two subsets differ too greatly, we may conclude 
the data was probably generated by a nonprobabilistic process. For any probabilistic process 
has a very small probability for this sort of discrepancy-- indeed the probability approaches 
zero for large N. 
(3) We can empirically determine relative frequencies, and perhaps this fact is in 
itself sufficient to justify assuming that there are probabilities. This is not adequate because 
the task of the MWI is precisely to find a theoretical structure which reproduces the 
empirical facts, and this includes reproducing the empirical fact that there are probabilities. 
We want a theoretical argument for this from within the MWI. 
Conclusion. By taking the "multiplicity of worlds" to occur at the level of consciousness, 
Le. of a multiplicity of perspectives on a single reality, I have shown that the MWI is a 
coherent and consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics. Many of the arguments that 
the MWI is inconsistent were shown to result from the erroneous notion that additional 
physical structure was needed to account for the multiplicity of worlds. The notion, put 
forth by Bell, for instance, that the quantum mechanical probabilities were only one of many 
probability distributions which could be imposed on the MWI was also shown to be incorrect 
when applied to the "psychological" version. But an important, possibly fatal, difficulty was 
shown to remain: that of vindicating this unique acceptable probability distribution by 
showing that so far, no adequate argument is apparent which uses the MWI to rule out 
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nonprobabilistic indeterminacy. Those who take a dubious view of the notion of 
nonprobabilistic indeterminacy (some Bayesians, for instance) may see no difficulty here. 
I view it as a major difficulty which should be a focus of future work on the MWI. 
Even if it is consistent and succeeds in reproducing the experimental facts, there are 
reasons for disliking the MWI, for instance that it implies the view that our minds 
occasionally split into many minds, which we will probably never be able to reestablish 
contact with, in different branches of the "universal wavefunction." While I certainly don't 
consider it a priori impossible that science should lead us to this belief--as proponents of the 
MWI believe it does--1 do consider this belief sufficiently bizarre a priori that it is worth 
investigating the alternatives. However, it may be more scientifically satisfying to adopt the 
splitting-consciousnesses view along with a physical theory that is rigorous, precise, and 
economical, than to adopt the "reduction of the statevector" view which is uneconomical in 
that it postulates two fundamental and radically different modes of change of the statevector, 
and fuzzy in that it gives no clear physical criteria for when one mode rather than the other 
obtains. Therefore interpretations which also reject statevector reduction appear the most 
promising alternatives to the MWI. I argued that the de Broglie-Bohm-Bell type of hidden 
variable theory, Bell's Everett(?) version of the MWI (C), its hidden-variables analog (F), 
and perhaps some many-worlds-with trajectories (D) interpretations remain logically 
acceptable alternatives. Their major differences with version (A) are the need to introduce 
probabilities explicitly as part of the physics, the need to add something to the Schrodinger 
formalism, and the related need to choose a preferred observable. Once it is necessary to 
do this, one might argue, with Bell, that there is little point in retaining the extra worlds; 
if so, the major alternatives are version (A) of the MWI and the de Broglie-Bohm-Bell pilot 
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wave t h e ~ r y . ~  Future work needs to examine the consequences and justification of the de 
Broglie-Bohm-Bell introduction of preferred observables. 
Despite my defense of the consistency and coherence of the MWI, my own 
sympathies are more with de Broglie-Bohm-Bell: I find the multiplication of consciousnesses 
in the MWI unappealing. This might be termed a mere metaphysical preference. But it is 
possible that the ultimate best choice of interpretation will be determined by its fruitfulness 
as the basis for new physical theories connecting quantum theory with gravitation, and 
"metaphysical" preferences between interpretations in part express different views on their 
fruitfulness in this endeavor. It is perhaps more likely, as Bell often suggests, that some 
wholly new way of viewing quantum theory will emerge out of such a synthesis. The 
currently available realistic interpretations of quantum theory may then be viewed as giving 
us suggestions about the nature of this future perspective on quantum theory, since they give 
us different pictures of reality which are consistent with current quantum theory and the 
experimental facts. The psychological version of the MWI suggests the most conservative 
possibility: that the basic structure of quantum theory may survive intact and without major 
additions-- at the price of a multiplication of consciousnesses. Hidden variable theories like 
de Broglie-Bohm suggest that a more radical revision of the quantum formalism, adding 
additional structure beyond a wavefunction framework, may eventuate.6 But whatever one's 
preferences, if one wants an accurate idea of the various kinds of realities that are 
compatible with quantum theory, it is important to give the psychological version of the 
'(F) is vulnerable to Bell's accusations of solipsism of the present moment and seems 
to have no compensating advantages over any of the other versions. I omit (E) on the 
grounds that preferred observables must be chosen on arbitrary, "human-centered'' grounds. 
See Bell (1981). 
The two types of theory also differ with respect to the nature of "nonlocality" or 
"nonseparability" they involve, but there is not space to treat this here. 
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MWI a place among consistent interpretations of that theory, and to understand the true 
nature of the remaining difficulties with it. 
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